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Abstract Lau and Murnighan’s faultline theory suggests that strong demographic
faultlines can undermine cohesion in work teams. A strong faultline splits a team into
internally homogeneous but mutually dissimilar subgroups based on demographic
characteristics. Social influence processes within these subgroups then lead to the
polarization of team members’ attitudes along the divisions imposed by the fault-
line. However, faultline theory hitherto neglects effects of attitude certainty. Research
shows that the certainty with which individuals hold their attitudes affects social influ-
ence processes. We extend theoretical faultline research by integrating attitude cer-
tainty. For this, we incorporate the interplay of the dynamics of attitude certainty
and social influence into a formal model of demographic faultline effects developed
by Flache and Mäs. Computational experiments suggest a moderation effect. Demo-
graphic faultlines only affect team cohesion if attitude certainty is low. We discuss
implications for future research.
Keywords Demographic faultline · Demographic diversity · Teams · Social
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1 Introduction
Recent decades saw an increase of both demographic diversity (Lau and Murnighan
2005; Tsui et al. 1992; van Knippenberg et al. 2004; van Knippenberg and Schip-
pers 2007) and reliance on work teams (Jehn et al. 1999; Lau and Murnighan 1998;
Milliken and Martins 1996) in organizations. The co-occurrence of these trends
fostered researchers’ interest in how diversity affects team processes and perfor-
mance (Williams and Meân 2004; Williams and O’Reilly 1998). Two major perspec-
tives emerged in the literature (van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007; Williams and
O’Reilly 1998) that jointly suggest that diversity is a “double-edged sword” (Milliken
and Martins 1996: 403). The information/decision-making perspective holds that di-
versity can benefit team performance, because it improves decision making through
a broader basis of information and human capital in the team (van Knippenberg and
Schippers 2007). By contrast, the social categorization perspective emphasizes that
diversity may be detrimental to team performance, because it evokes social catego-
rization and identification processes that threaten social cohesion and increase rela-
tionship conflict (van Knippenberg et al. 2004).
Given the downside of diversity, it appears questionable how teams can exploit
its potential benefits (van Knippenberg et al. 2004). Lau and Murnighan’s (1998)
faultline theory opened up an intriguing new perspective on this problem. The the-
ory suggests that demographic diversity does not necessarily reduce social cohesion.
Rather, similar to Blau’s (1977b) classical theory of crosscutting social circles, Lau
and Murnighan pointed out that what matters is how multiple demographic character-
istics (such as age and ethnicity) are correlated in a given team. Strongly correlated
characteristics give rise to a strong demographic faultline that splits a team into few
internally homogeneous but mutually dissimilar subgroups (e.g. a division between
younger Hispanic women and older Caucasian men). They argued that under this
condition team cohesion can come under pressure. Individuals preferentially inter-
act with others whom they perceive as similar. Under a strong demographic faultline
this can lead to segregated interaction in a team. Social influence processes then tend
to reinforce preexisting differences in the attitudes of members of different demo-
graphic subgroups, entailing subgroup polarization along the demographic faultline.
However, the outcome is different when demographic characteristics are uncorre-
lated, that is, when the faultline is weak. In such a situation, interaction between
team members is not segregated and social influence processes are likely to promote
consensus across different demographic subcategories in the team. Accordingly, Lau
and Murnighan (1998) suggested that a team with weak demographic faultlines can
benefit from its demographic diversity, whereas strong faultlines are likely to impede
performance.
Empirical research in the wake of Lau and Murnighan’s contribution has partially
confirmed the expected negative effects of strong faultlines (Lau and Murnighan
2005; Molleman 2005; Thatcher et al. 2003). At the same time, the theory neglects
hitherto an important insight from social psychological research on social influence
that—as we argue in this paper—might yield new theoretical implications for the
effects of faultlines on team cohesion. Faultline theory neglects that the extent to
which individuals are open to social influence depends on their attitude certainty.
198 A. Grow, A. Flache
The less certain someone is about the correctness of her attitude, the more open
she becomes for influence (Festinger 1950, 1954; McGarty et al. 1993; Smith et al.
2007). Conversely, the more certain a person is, the less susceptible she is to out-
side influence (Pomerantz et al. 1995). Social influence processes are in faultline
theory the causal link between faultline strength and team cohesion. Hence, if we
combine faultline theory with the notion that attitude certainty impedes influence,
the implication should be that attitude certainty moderates the relation between fault-
lines and team cohesion. The higher the attitude certainty among team members,
the less team cohesion should be affected by the strength of a demographic fault-
line.
The postulated moderation effect follows, however, less straightforwardly than
our reasoning suggests up to this point. A second insight from social psychological
research complicates the analysis. Empirical studies (e.g. Hensley and Duval 1976;
Holtz 1997, 2003, 2004; Holtz and Miller 1985, 2001; Holtz and Nihiser 2008; Smith
et al. 2007) indicate that attitude certainty is partially endogenous to social influence
processes. That is, attitude certainty is itself subject to influence. Even individuals
who hold their attitudes with high certainty can become less certain if nobody agrees
with them. Similarly, individuals who hold their attitudes with low certainty can be-
come more certain if others agree with them. This implies that any initial level of atti-
tude certainty among team members might change in the course of social interaction.
As a consequence, the degree to which attitude certainty impedes social influence is
also subject to change.
The complex interdependency of attitude certainty, social influence, and faultline
strength renders it difficult to gain solid intuitions about the aggregated outcomes of
individual interactions in a team. Accordingly, in elaborating our theoretical argu-
ment we follow the lead of an increasing number of theorists who advocate the use
of agent based computational modeling for understanding complex social dynamics
with multiple interacting individuals (Bonabeau 2002; Harrison et al. 2007; Macy
and Willer 2002; Smith and Conrey 2007).
Our contribution to faultline research is an integration of faultline theory with
insights from research on the effects and dynamics of attitude certainty. We examine
theoretically whether attitude certainty can moderate the effect of faultlines on team
cohesion in terms of consensus and subgroup polarization. To this end, we draw on
and extend an agent based computational model that Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b)
proposed as a formalization of faultline theory.
In the remainder, we provide the theoretical basis of the assumptions of our model
in Sect. 2. Next, the model is elaborated formally in Sect. 3. To explore model im-
plications we conducted computational experiments. Results are reported in Sect. 4.
Section 5 closes the paper with a discussion and outlook for future research. Note that
in the social-psychological literature the terms attitude certainty and uncertainty are
used interchangeably (e.g. Gross et al. 1995). To facilitate the model description, and
following the convention in earlier models of effects of attitude certainty on influence
processes (e.g. Deffuant et al. 2002), from here on we employ the terms high and low
uncertainty which are equivalent to the terms low and high attitude certainty.
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2 Theory
2.1 Demographic faultlines and team cohesion
Drawing on Blau (1977a) and O’Reilly et al. (1989), Lau and Murnighan (1998)
assumed that individuals define their social identity to a large extent based on their
demographic characteristics and have a preference to interact with those who are
similar to them in these characteristics. Interaction in diverse teams is therefore likely
to be structured by the distribution of demographic characteristics. However, Lau and
Murnighan also stressed that individuals can hold multiple identities simultaneously
(e.g. identities simultaneously based on gender, age, and ethnicity). Thus, the more
several demographic characteristics coincide, the more likely social interactions will
be constrained to demographic subgroups, because then different aspects of team
members’ identities induce the same patterns of interaction in the group.
The degree of alignment of several demographic characteristics is captured by the
notion of demographic faultlines. An example helps clarifying this notion. Imagine
two teams (cf. Lau and Murnighan 1998): Team A contains two Caucasian male
members and two African-American female members; Team B contains one African-
American and one Caucasian male member, as well as one African-American and
one Caucasian female member. Both teams are alike in terms of diversity on each
demographic characteristic considered separately. However, in Team A ethnicity and
gender coincide and create a strong faultline that leads to clear-cut structures of non-
overlapping subgroups based on both demographic characteristics. This facilitates
identification processes and can lead interaction to occur mainly among the African-
American male and among the Caucasian female team members. In Team B, ethnicity
and gender create only weak faultlines, given that subgroup membership based on
these characteristics is to some extent overlapping. Interaction is therefore less likely
to be constrained to smaller subsets of team members.
Lau and Murnighan (1998: 332) suggested that the interaction structures that
strong faultlines induce can lead subgroups to “find themselves polarizing and taking
positions that become increasingly extreme”. The reason is that similar individuals
influence each other during their interaction by providing additional arguments that
support each others’ attitudes. Following a common social-psychological conception
of attitudes, Lau and Murnighan assumed that attitudes toward an object (e.g. policies
and procedures in an organization) can vary in degree from negative to positive (cf.
Gross et al. 1995). Interaction within demographic subgroups reinforces pre-existing
attitude similarity, whereas these attitudes become at the same time more extreme.
That is, attitude variance within subgroups declines while attitudes shift at the same
time toward either the negative or the positive side. In this process, reinforcement
of preexisting within-group similarities increases preexisting attitude differences be-
tween subgroups, heightening the potential of intergroup conflict. However, if fault-
lines are weak interaction is not restrained to subgroups. Then, social influence more
likely fosters overall consensus on salient issues.
As starting point of our formalization, we draw upon Flache and Mäs’ (2008a,
2008b) recently proposed agent-based computational model of the effects of fault-
lines on team cohesion and extend their model to incorporate uncertainty in individ-
uals’ attitudes. Their model of social influence and selection builds on the four social
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mechanisms homophily, social influence, heterophobia, and rejection. Homophily is
the tendency of individuals to be attracted to, and to preferentially interact with, oth-
ers who are like them (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001;
Milliken and Martins 1996). During interaction, similar individuals have the tendency
to influence each others’ attitudes (Festinger et al. 1950) and thereby become more
similar and more attracted to each other (we refer to this also as positive influence).
Heterophobia, on the other hand, is the tendency to avoid and dislike others whose
dissimilarity exceeds a certain level (cf. Hensley and Duval 1976). If two individuals
dislike each other, they have the tendency to reject each others’ attitudes. That is, indi-
viduals modify their attitudes such that they become more dissimilar (we refer to this
also as negative influence). This assumption is inspired by research building on the
self-categorization paradigm in social identity theory (Brewer 1991; Hogg et al. 1990;
Tajfel and Turner 1986) which holds that humans adjust their attitudes and behavior
in a way to minimize the heterogeneity within their ingroups and to maximize differ-
ences to outgroups.
In this model, similarity perceptions between individuals are based on both demo-
graphic characteristics and attitudes. This is in line with Lau and Murnighan’s (1998)
assumption that also characteristics that are less obvious than surface demographic
characteristics might determine individuals’ similarity perceptions.
Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b) showed how their model generated two key re-
sults in line with Lau and Murnighan’s theoretical expectations. First, teams with
weak faultlines are likely to arrive at overall consensus. The reason is that if fault-
lines are weak, overall demographic similarity in the team is large enough to pre-
clude strongly negative relations between most team members. Positive influence
processes therefore prevail and eventually induce overall consensus. Second, teams
with strong faultlines are likely to arrive at subgroup polarization. The reason is that
if faultlines are strong, relations within demographic subgroups are likely to be pos-
itive (homophily), while relations between members of different demographic sub-
groups tend to be negative (heterophobia). As a consequence, positive influence oc-
curs primarily within subgroups, whereas negative influence increasingly amplifies
emerging attitude differences between subgroups. This leads to subgroup polariza-
tion.
We discuss next how integrating uncertainty in this model might alter these pre-
dictions.
2.2 Uncertainty and social influence
Uncertainty in attitudes refers to a situation in which individuals have low confidence
in the correctness of their evaluation of an attitude object (cf. Festinger 1954; Gross
et al. 1995; Holtz 2003; Smith et al. 2008). Uncertainty is central to a number of
social psychological theories of influence processes (McGarty et al. 1993), such as the
theory of social comparison processes (Festinger 1954) and self-categorization theory
(Turner 1985). However, research varies in conceptualizing uncertainty as exogenous
or endogenous to influence processes (cf. Gross et al. 1995).
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2.2.1 Uncertainty as an exogenous factor
Theories that link uncertainty to individuals’ openness to social influence typically
conceptualize uncertainty as exogenous to influence processes. The more uncertain
individuals are, the more open they become to influence by information that sug-
gests a different evaluation of an attitude object. The reason is that they “have a
fundamental need to feel certain about their world and their place within it [. . . ,
motivating] behavior that reduces subjective uncertainty” (Hogg and Mullin 1999:
253). Experiencing high uncertainty is an aversive state (Smith et al. 2007) and
changing attitudes to make them more congruent with the provided information is
a means to reduce uncertainty. However, individuals not only become more open
to influence the more uncertain they are, they also become more resistant to it
the more convinced they are that their attitudes are correct (McGarty et al. 1993;
Turner 1991). This positive relation between uncertainty and influence found ample
support in empirical research (e.g. Jetten et al. 2000; Pomerantz et al. 1995; Wilke et
al. 1995).
The social-psychological notion of uncertainty is reflected in formal models of
opinion dynamics that assume ‘bounded confidence’ (e.g. Deffuant et al. 2002;
Hegselmann and Krause 2002). Following these models, we assume that the level
of uncertainty translates into the size of a confidence interval that defines a range of
‘acceptable’ attitudes located within a certain distance around the focal individual’s
position on a continuous attitude scale. Only attitudes that fall within this range are
perceived as ‘plausible’ or ‘agreeable’ and are therefore taken into account by the in-
dividual. The more uncertain the individual is, the wider this interval becomes. This
conceptualization is mirrored in social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961)
that assumes that individuals have a latitude of acceptance around their actual attitude
that defines a range of positions that are considered acceptable. Also the size of this
latitude has been assumed to vary with how confident an individual can be that her
own attitude is correct (Insko et al. 1966).
Confining influence to attitudes within an acceptable distance imposes a new re-
striction on the dynamics that Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b) implemented in their
model. While the overall similarity of two individuals determines whether they can
influence each other positively or negatively, influence on a particular issue can actu-
ally only occur if there is sufficient attitude similarity on that issue. The less uncertain
individuals are, the smaller is the range of attitudes that are deemed acceptable. As a
consequence, even if two team members are in general very similar, they cannot in-
fluence each others’ attitude on a particular issue if their attitude difference exceeds
the threshold defined by their uncertainty. While this view implies that low levels of
uncertainty impede both positive and negative social influence, it does not take into
account that uncertainty itself can change during of the process of social influence.
To this issue we turn next.
2.2.2 Uncertainty as an endogenous factor
Social-psychological research has shown that an individual’s uncertainty is influ-
enced by informational/cognitive factors, such as the knowledge about and expe-
rience with an attitude object, and by social/consensual factors, such as perceived
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similarity of the own attitude with that of relevant others (Gross et al. 1995). Individ-
uals typically experience high subjective uncertainty if they encounter new situations
for which they have no relevant experience or insufficient information. Organization
research has pointed to a range of settings that exhibit these characteristics. Exam-
ples are highly complex and dynamical organizational environments (Duncan 1972),
organizations that switch from traditional hierarchical management to team based
management (Bordia et al. 2004), or that introduce new and complex team tasks for
which team members cannot rely on existing scripts and routines (Jehn 1995).
Perceived agreement or disagreement of the own attitude with that of relevant oth-
ers has been shown to be an important social/consensual factor that influences uncer-
tainty. Festinger (1950, 1954) argued that social/consensual factors become particu-
larly important if informational/cognitive factors do not suffice to reduce uncertainty.
Scholars of self-categorization theory go further and argue that social/consensual fac-
tors are the most important determinant of individuals’ uncertainty, even in the pres-
ence of sufficient experience and knowledge (Hogg and Mullin 1999). They point
out that the effects of agreement or disagreement with others crucially depend on the
focal individual’s perception of shared social identity.
On the one hand, uncertainty has been assumed to decrease if individuals find
their cognitions in line with those of others with whom they identify, because
these others are expected to “share key beliefs and values that are presumed to
safeguard the integrity of their judgments” (Holtz 1997: 539). Conversely, if sim-
ilar individuals disagree, uncertainty is likely to increase (McGarty et al. 1993;
Smith et al. 2007), because disagreement indicates that one’s attitudes are po-
tentially incorrect. For both mechanisms researchers have found empirical sup-
port. A number of experiments conducted by Holtz and colleagues (Holtz 1997,
2003, 2004; Holtz and Miller 1985, 2001; Holtz and Nihiser 2008) suggest that
already mere subjective perception of consensual support for one’s attitudes by
similar others is connected to decreased uncertainty. This effect is stronger the
more similar attitudes of these others are assumed to be (Holtz and Miller 2001;
Holtz and Nihiser 2008), and the more important the specific issue is to the individ-
ual (e.g. Holtz and Miller 1985, 2001). Furthermore, Smith et al. (2007) found that
individuals report increased uncertainty if they are confronted with group norms that
are ostensibly not in line with their point of view.
On the other hand, it has been assumed that the effect of attitudes of dissimi-
lar others on uncertainty are antithetical to those of similar others. Agreement with
dissimilar others should increase uncertainty because it challenges the social distinc-
tiveness and thereby the correctness of the attitude of the focal individual (Hogg and
Mullin 1999). However, if the attitudes of dissimilar others are clearly different, then
the correctness of the attitude is verified in terms of social distinctiveness (Hogg and
Mullin 1999) and uncertainty decreases (Holtz and Miller 2001). Indeed, Holtz and
colleagues (Holtz 2003, 2004; Holtz and Miller 2001; Holtz and Nihiser 2008) found
that the larger the perceived difference between the own attitude and that of dissimilar
others, the less uncertain individuals are that their own attitudes are correct (see also
Hensley and Duval 1976).
The research evidence leads us to incorporate into our model the assumption that
a team member’s current level of uncertainty increases to the extent that similar oth-
ers disagree and dissimilar others agree with her. Conversely, we also assume that
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uncertainty decreases if similar others agree and dissimilar others disagree with the
team member. With these assumptions, effects of uncertainty on the relation between
faultline strength and team cohesion do not only depend on the initial distribution of
uncertainty in the team, but also on the dynamics that change uncertainty. For exam-
ple, while initially low uncertainty may impede influence processes and thus prevent
either consensus or polarization, team members’ uncertainty may increase over time
and give room to the dynamics that eventually entail either of these outcomes.
We translated these assumptions into a formal model, in order to obtain a solid
intuition of how our extensions of faultline theory may change its implications. The
model is fully elaborated in the next section.
3 The model
3.1 Team member characteristics and influence processes
Each of the N members of the virtual team is represented as an agent i, who is charac-
terized by two types of attributes, namely demographic characteristics and attitudes.
Demographic characteristics are ‘fixed’ and not subject to change, whereas attitudes
are ‘flexible’ and subject to change. Agents have D demographic characteristics,
where af ixid refers to the value of the d th demographic characteristic of agent i. Simi-
larly, there are K issues in a team and af lexik,t is the attitude of i on the kth issue at time
point t . Demographic characteristics can take the values −1 and 1 (af ixid ∈ {−1;1})
and attitudes can vary continuously between −1 and 1 (−1 ≤ af lexik,t ≤ 1). As indi-
cated earlier, both demographic characteristics and attitudes determine the level of
dyadic similarity, denoted wij,t , that agents perceive. We discuss below how this
similarity is computed.
Each agent can hold each of her K attitudes with a different level of uncertainty,
indicated by the uncertainty level μik,t . This parameter can vary continuously be-
tween 0 and 2 (0 ≤ μik,t ≤ 2) and creates an interval around the respective attitude
that takes the form of af lexik,t ± μik,t . The interval indicates a range of values that
i perceives as potentially correct. A larger interval indicates higher uncertainty. If
μik,t = 2, the interval entails the entire attitude continuum, regardless of i’s actual
attitude.
The simulation algorithm proceeds as follows. Upon initialization of a simulation
run, agents’ demographic characteristics and attitudes are assigned and dyadic simi-
larities are computed. Initial attitudes are randomly chosen from the entire interval of
possible values, drawn from a uniform distribution. Initial demographic characteris-
tics are used to impose an exogenously given strength of the demographic faultline,
based on a procedure proposed by Flache and Mäs (2008a) that we explain below.
We express the length of a simulation run in iterations, where each iteration of
the simulation consists of N steps. In each step one agent from the team is selected
at random (with replacement) for either updating dyadic similarities (wij,t ) or for
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updating all attitudes (af lexik,t ) and all uncertainty levels (μik,t ).
1 In the latter case,
first, all attitudes are updated. After that, all uncertainty levels of the respective agent
are updated.
The three updating processes are discussed in detail below. To express the tem-
poral structure of updating dyadic similarities, attitudes, and uncertainty levels, we
use in the following subscript t to refer to the state of a characteristic at the be-
ginning of a particular updating process (i.e. at the beginning of updating dyadic
similarities, updating of attitudes, or updating of uncertainty levels); subscript t + 1
indicates the state of a characteristic after the particular updating process is com-
pleted.
3.1.1 Updating dyadic similarities
Upon updating, dyadic similarity wij,t is calculated as the average difference across
both fixed and flexible attributes between agents i and j . Dyadic similarity can vary
continuously between −1 and 1 (−1 ≤ wij,t ≤ 1). If wij,t is equal to or larger than 0, i
and j perceive each other as similar. If wij,t is smaller than 0, they perceive each other
as dissimilar. Dyadic similarity affects the strength and direction of the influence that
another agent has on i’s attitudes, and whether the agreement in attitudes between i
and j increases or decreases i’s uncertainty. We assume that weights are symmetric.
Equation (1) formalizes the computation of dyadic similarity.
wij,t+1 = 1 −
∑D
d=1 |af ixid − af ixjd | +
∑K
k=1 |af lexik,t − af lexjk,t |
(D + K) (1)
3.1.2 Updating attitudes and uncertainty levels
Upon updating, attitudes of the selected agent i are updated with regard to all K is-
sues. For every issue updating is conducted in two steps. First, it is determined for
all other agents j whether j can potentially affect i ’s attitude. The partial effect of a
particular other agent j on i’s attitude with regard to issue k, denoted γijk,t , is mathe-
matically defined in (2a) and (2b). The overall change of i’s attitude is the sum of all
partial attitude effects γijk,t from all other agents j . We inherit this assumption from a
number of earlier models (Abelson 1964; Hegselmann and Krause 2002). The partial
attitude effect of j on i’s attitude is only different from 0 (i.e. γijk,t = 0) if j ’s attitude
a
f lex
jk,t is sufficiently similar to i’s attitude, with boundaries given by a
f lex
ik,t ± μik,t . In
this case, the magnitude of γijk,t indicates the strength of the effect that j ’s attitude
has on that of i, which can vary continuously from 0 to 2 (0 ≤ γijk,t ≤ 2).




ik,t . In other
words, if i considers j as similar, i’s attitude is ‘pulled’ toward j ’s attitude by posi-
tive influence. For dissimilar agents, (2a) does not indicate the direction of influence,
but only its magnitude. Equation (2b) implements, in combination with (3), the di-
rection of influence. For dissimilar agents, this is away from the attitude of the source
1With probability 0.5 dyadic similarities are updated, otherwise attitudes and uncertainty levels are up-
dated.
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of influence. To obtain the magnitude of this negative influence in (2a), the attitude
difference is subtracted from 2. As a consequence, the closer the attitude of two dis-
similar agents, the stronger the attitude of agent j repulses i’s attitude. This reflects
that the more similar the attitude of an otherwise dissimilar agent is, the stronger is
i’s need for differentiation, as suggested by van Knippenberg and Wilke (1988).2 As
indicated in (2b), if two dissimilar agents hold the same attitude on a particular is-








jk,t − af lexik,t , if |af lexjk,t − af lexik,t | ≤ μik,t ∧ wij,t ≥ 0
(2 − |af lexjk,t − af lexik,t |)Sign(x), if |af lexjk,t − af lexik,t | ≤ μik,t ∧ wij,t < 0






1, if (af lexjk,t − af lexik,t ) > 0
−1, if (af lexjk,t − af lexik,t ) < 0
random ∈ {−1;1}, if (af lexjk,t − af lexik,t ) = 0
(2b)
In a second step, actual attitude change is calculated. This is defined in (3). During
the attitude updating process, i’s new attitude, denoted af lexik,t+1, is calculated as the
sum of the original attitude and the weighted average of all partial attitude effects.
The number of partial attitude effects is denoted Ck,t (with Ck,t ≤ (N − 1)) and
represents the number of cases in which i actually takes the attitude of another j into
account (i.e. all cases for which |af lexjk,t − af lexik,t | ≤ μik,t ). This number is multiplied
by 2 in order to make attitude change more gradual. Each partial attitude effect is
additionally weighted by wij,t . This implements two theoretical assumptions. First,
the sign of wij,t ensures that similar (dissimilar) others instigate a move of i’s attitude
toward (away from) j ’s attitude. Second, a specific difference in the attitudes of i and
j has a stronger effect the more similar (dissimilar) they are in general. Equation (3)
illustrates the basic principle of attitude change. Actual change is modeled as defined
in (3a) and (3b) in order to avoid that attitudes take values smaller than −1 and larger
2This inversion is not implemented in the original model developed by Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b).
However, this inversion is more in line with the notion that if dissimilar others hold very dissimilar (similar)
attitudes, then the threat for the validity of the own attitude should be lower (higher), as put forward here.
To check the comparability of the outcome of our model with that of the original model, we fixed the
uncertainty attached to agents’ attitudes to a value of 2. In this case, our model is equivalent to the model
of Flache and Mäs, except for the rejection effect. The outcome that we obtained from our model was
qualitatively identical to the outcome reported by Flache and Mäs.
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than 1, and to smoothen attitude change at both ends of the attitude continuum.3
a
f lex




















ik,t + af lexik,t (1 − af lexik,t ), if af lexik,t > 0
a
f lex
ik,t + af lexik,t (1 + af lexik,t ), if af lexik,t ≤ 0.
(3b)
Attitude updates are immediately followed by updates of the corresponding uncer-
tainty levels, based on the location of i’s new attitudes relative to those of all other
agents. The new uncertainty level for a particular issue, denoted μik,t+1, is the sum of
the original uncertainty and the weighted average of all effects that the attitudes of all
other agents have on this uncertainty. This is mathematically defined in (4a) and (4b).
The number of attitudes that impinge on i’s uncertainty on the respective issue is
denoted Ak,t (with Ak,t = (N − 1)) and is multiplied by 2 in order to make change
in uncertainty more gradual. The size and direction of the effect that the attitude of
any other agent can have on i’s uncertainty depends on both whether i perceives j
as similar or dissimilar and on the difference between af lexjk,t and a
f lex
ik,t relatively to
μik,t . For similar agents, uncertainty decreases if a
f lex
jk,t falls within a
f lex
ik,t ±μik,t . The
smaller the attitude distance, the larger is the decrease of uncertainty. If af lexjk,t does
not fall into the interval af lexik,t ±μik,t , uncertainty increases with the distance between
a
f lex
jk,t and the boundary of a
f lex
ik,t ± μik,t . For dissimilar agents, uncertainty increases
to the extent that af lexjk,t reaches into a
f lex
ik,t ± μik,t , but decreases to the extent that
a
f lex
jk,t is distant from the boundary of a
f lex
ik,t ± μik,t . Each of these effects is weighted
by |wij,t | to implement the notion that j affects i’s uncertainty more to the extent
that i and j are either very similar or very dissimilar. To assure that uncertainty stays
within valid boundaries, resulting values of μik,t+1 that fall outside of [0,2] are reset
to the nearest interval boundary.
These dynamics of uncertainty imply the possibility of changing asymmetries in
influence within a dyad. For instance, if two agents are initially equally uncertain
about their attitude about a specific issue (i.e. if μik = μjk), differences in their own
attitude relative to that of the surrounding agents can lead to differences in μik and
3Equation (3) differs from (1) in Flache and Mäs (2008b) in two aspects. First, Flache and Mäs model the





) (note that we
added the subscript t at appropriate places). Hence, in the original model, i’s attitude is affected by the
attitudes of all other agents, weighted by their similarity to i. We model this effect by wij,t γijk,t . This
means that in our model i’s attitude is not necessarily affected by the attitudes of all other agents, but only
by those attitudes that fall within af lex
ik,t
± μik,t . Second, in Flache and Mäs Ck,t is always equal to the
number of all j ’s in the team who are linked to i in the access network. Here Ck,t is equal to the number
of j ’s whose attitudes fall within af lex
ik,t
± μik,t .
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μjk (e.g. j might become less uncertain than i), possibly resulting in an asymmetric
influence relation between i and j .







(|af lexjk,t − af lexik,t |) − μik,t , if wij,t ≥ 0
μik,t − (|af lexjk,t − af lexik,t |), if wij,t < 0
(4b)
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the mechanisms defined in this section. Both figures
represent a simplified situation with a team that consists of two agents, i and j . In
Fig. 1, both agents are maximally similar on all fixed and flexible attributes, except
for af lex1 ; in Fig. 2, both agents are maximally dissimilar (similarity is indicated
by shading of the circles). The attitude values of both agents regarding af lex1 are
indicated by the position of the circles along the x-axis. The uncertainty level attached
to both agents’ attitudes is represented by error-bars.
In part (a) of Fig. 1, the attitudes of the agents before the updating processes
are af lexi1 = −0.3 and af lexj1 = 0.1. The uncertainties attached to these attitudes are
μi1 = 0.6 and μj1 = 0.2. Assume now that agent i is selected for updating atti-
tudes and uncertainty levels. Agent i is positively influenced by j , because af lexj1,t
falls within af lexi1,t ± μi1,t , and their mutual similarity weight wij,t is positive. As a
consequence i’s attitude shifts towards j ’s attitude. That is, af lexi1,t+1 is closer to a
f lex
j1,t
than af lexi1,t (note that from t to t + 1 agent j ’s attitude does not change). After up-
dating i’s attitudes the uncertainty levels are updated. Agent i’s uncertainty in af lexi1,t
decreases (i.e. the bars become narrower), because af lexj1,t falls within a
f lex
i1,t ±μi1,t and
wij,t > 0 (note that from t to t + 1 agent j ’s uncertainty level does not change). Part
(b) of Fig. 1 illustrates a case in which the updating of i’s attitudes already took place;
we are thus only interested in changes in i’s uncertainty level. In this case i is ini-
tially less uncertain than in the case shown in part (a). As the increase in the size of
μi1 indicates, i becomes more uncertain in a
f lex
i1 , because a
f lex
j1,t does not fall within
a
f lex
i1,t ± μi1,t .
Part (a) of Fig. 2 shows the same attitude configuration that was shown in part
(a) of Fig. 1. This time it is assumed that i and j are dissimilar, with a negative
mutual similarity weight wij,t . In part (a) of Fig. 2, i is negatively influenced by





Subsequently, agent i’s uncertainty in af lexi1 decreases, because a
f lex
j1,t does not fall
within af lexi1,t ±μi1,t and wij,t < 0. Again, part (b) of Fig. 2 illustrates a case in which
the updating of i’s attitudes already took place. As the increase in the size of μi1
indicates, i becomes more uncertain in af lexi1 , because a
f lex
j1,t falls within a
f lex
i1,t ±μi1,t .
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Fig. 1 Changes in attitude and
uncertainty of agent i in af lex1
in the presence of agent j
(N = 2); the agents are
maximally similar on all other
attributes (i.e. wij,t = 0.94).
Error-bars attached to the
attitude position of each agent
illustrate the uncertainty level
attached to the respective
attitude
3.2 Conditions for the computational experiments
We vary two key conditions between teams in our computational experiments,
strength of demographic faultlines and the level of initial uncertainty among team
members. We assume teams with 20 members (N = 20), each with 3 demographic
characteristics (D = 3) and 4 attitudes (K = 4). Using 3 demographic characteristics
enables us to vary faultline strength sufficiently fine-grained for the purpose of this
study. At the same time, using 4 attitudes ensures that agents’ perceptions of mutual
similarity/dissimilarity are not fully determined by demographic attributes. Similar to
Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b) we implement 6 levels of faultline strength as shown
in Table 1. In this table, each row represents one agent and each column corresponds
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Fig. 2 Changes in attitude and
uncertainty of agent i in af lex1
in the presence of agent j
(N = 2); the agents are
maximally dissimilar on all
other attributes (i.e.
wij,t = −0.77). Error-bars
attached to the attitude position
of each agent illustrate the
uncertainty level attached to the
respective attitude
to the value on a specific demographic characteristic for the respective agent. The
frequency of each of the two possible values of each demographic characteristic—
which are differentiated by shading to facilitate visual identification—is the same
in each column. In this way, diversity in each characteristic is constant within and
across faultline conditions. This enables us to disentangle effects of faultline strength
from effects of different levels of diversity. Faultline strength, denoted r , is expressed
as the correlation between the three demographic characteristics. If r = 1, all three
demographic characteristics coincide across all agents. In this case, agents can be
divided into two equally sized subgroups whose members are internally maximally
similar but mutually maximally dissimilar in terms of demographic characteristics.
With decreasing r , subgroup boundaries become more diffuse.
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Table 1 Implementation of different levels of faultline strength
Table 2 Different levels of










Teams differ, furthermore, in the level of initial uncertainty, denoted μin, that de-
fines at the outset the same size of the uncertainty level for all agents and all attitudes.
For ease of interpretation, we let values of the parameter initial uncertainty vary con-
tinuously from 0 to 1 (0 ≤ μin ≤ 1), where 1 indicates that all agents have initially
the largest possible uncertainty level (μi = 2) and 0 indicates the lowest possible un-
certainty level (μi = 0) for all agents. We investigate the effects of 6 different levels
of initial uncertainty. Table 2 shows how each of these levels relates to numerical re-
alizations of the uncertainty level. To disentangle general effects of the level of initial
uncertainty in a team from effects that might arise from differences in uncertainty
among team members, all team members are initially equally uncertain in all their
attitudes. However, these uncertainties can independently change in the course of the
simulation process.
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3.3 Aggregate outcome measures
Our main interest is in studying the effects of the strength of demographic faultlines
and initial uncertainty on the degree of consensus or polarization in the distribution
of attitudes that results in a team. We use two measures to assess the level of polar-
ization of demographic subgroups, polarization and co-variation of fixed and flexible
attributes. In addition, we use the measure attitude variance to assess the degree of
consensus in a team. To indicate the degree to which, overall, agents are open for
social influence, we also measure average uncertainty across all team members. The
measures of the co-variation of fixed and flexible attributes and the measure of the
attitude variance are adopted from Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b).
The measure of polarization, denoted pol, captures the extent to which the team
falls apart into subgroups such that agents’ attitudes are maximally similar within
a subgroup but maximally dissimilar between the subgroups. A team is maximally
polarized if it is split into two equally large such subgroups. The measure is obtained
in two steps. In the first step, we identify the subgroup of agents that most clearly
forms a cohesive subgroup in terms of its internal agreement and disagreement with
those agents who do not belong to this subgroup. In the second step, we obtain a
measure that captures the degree to which internal attitude agreement within this
subgroup exceeds agreement between members and non-members of the subgroup.4
To find the most cohesive subgroup we adapt the concept of LS sets developed
in graph theory. The “definition of an LS set compares the frequency of ties within
and between subsets [in a graph . . .]. Lines within the LS set [. . . ] should be more
numerous than lines from a subset of nodes in an LS set to non-LS set members”
(Wasserman and Faust 1994: 269). The graph on basis of which we identify cohe-
sive subsets is given by the pairwise attitude similarities, denoted saf lex ij . Techni-
cally, saf lex ij is obtained as two minus the absolute value of the average difference in
agents’ attitudes, as given by (5).
saf lex ij = 2 −
∑K
k=1 |af lexik − af lexjk |
K
(5)
Pairwise attitude similarities result in a valued graph, while the original definition
of LS sets is based on a binary graph. Accordingly, we modified the criterion for a
subset S of agents to qualify as a cohesive subset such that for each of the nodes in S,
the weighted sum of the ties to all other nodes in S exceeds the weighted sum of ties
to nodes outside of S. This modification relaxes the original definition also in another
way. We do not require that the criterion is met for every subset of S, but only for
every node of S. Without this latter modification the criterion turned out to be far too
restrictive for our purposes.
4The measure presented here is different from the polarization measure used by Flache and Mäs (2008a,
2008b). We tested whether the qualitative results reported in the current article remain identical if we
use their measure. No qualitative difference was found. We decided to nevertheless use the new measure,
because it is somewhat more sensitive to changes in the distribution of attitudes than the measure employed
by Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b).
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The adapted criterion allows identifying cohesive subsets but it does not yield a
numerical value for their degree of cohesiveness. To this end we use a measure that
we call subset segregation of a subset S, denoted σS . This measure is based on the
difference of the density of the network of attitude similarities between members of
the subset S and the density of the network of attitude similarities between members














(li (1 − lj ) + lj (1 − li ))saf lex ij (6)
In (6), NS refers to the number of members of the subset S, N indicates group
size, and lk = 0 when agent k is not a member of the focal set S, whereas lk = 1
when k belongs to the focal set. The measure can theoretically vary continuously
from −2 to 2 (−2 ≤ σS ≤ 2). It takes 0 when all agents belong to the set; it takes
2 if the attitudes of the members of the set are maximally similar but at the same
time maximally dissimilar from the attitudes of non-members of the set. However,
in real graphs it is unlikely that σS falls below 0. To align it with our other output
measures, we divide this measure by 2, leading to a range of −1 to 1 (−1 ≤ σS2 ≤ 1).
Given that cohesive subsets can vary in size, we additionally weigh σS by the extent
to which the size of the subset approaches half of the size of the team. Technically,
the weighting factor η is obtained as defined in (7). The final measure of polarization
(pol) is defined in (8). It can vary continuously between 0 and 1 (0 ≤ pol ≤ 1), where
1 indicates maximal polarization as defined above. Within a typical graph there is
more than one possible cohesive subset by our criterion; we take the segregation of
the most segregated cohesive subset S set as the outcome measure.
η = 1 − 2 |
N
2 − NS |
N
(7)
pol = ησS (8)
Co-variation in fixed and flexible attributes, denoted cov(fix;flex), indicates the
extent to which differences in demographic characteristics among team members co-
incide with differences in attitudes. This is measured as the covariance of the dif-
ferences in demographic dissimilarities and differences in attitudes across all pairs
of agents in the team. Equations (9a) and (9b) define the calculation of the pairwise
differences in demographic characteristics and attitudes, respectively. Equation (10)








|af ixid − af ixjd | (9a)













ij − f ixij )(f lexij − f lexij ))
N(N − 1) (10)
Attitude variance, denoted var, indicates the ‘diversity’ in attitudes in a team. This
is measured as the average of the standard deviation of each of the K attitudes in
a team. The measure can vary continuously from 0 to 1 (0 ≤ var ≤ 1). It takes 0 if
there is perfect consensus in a team (i.e. all team members hold maximally similar
attitudes). In the case of maximal polarization, as defined here, var takes the value 1.
However, high values of var do not necessarily indicate polarization. For example,
var can also take comparatively high values in situations in which all agents’ attitudes
are widely spread across the entire attitude space, without the formation of distinct
cohesive subgroups.
Average uncertainty, denoted μ, is calculated as the average uncertainty level
across all attitudes of all agents. To align it with our other outcome measures, we









4 Results of computational experiments
As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, we varied both faultline strength and initial uncer-
tainty from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.2. This created 36 experimental conditions. Upon
initialization, fixed attributes were assigned to agents as indicated in Table 1. Agents’
flexible attributes were drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. In the following,
we first discuss four exemplary simulation runs in detail. Subsequently, we present
the values of the outcome measures, averaged across 50 independent realizations of
the simulation experiment for each experimental condition. Each of these realizations
had 50,000 iterations.5
Figures 3 and 4 depict ‘snapshots’ of single realizations of the process of attitude
and uncertainty formation in four different prototypical conditions. We selected a
2 × 2 combination of low vs. high faultline strength (r = 0/1) and low vs. high initial
uncertainty (μin = 0.2/0.8). In these conditions, faultlines are minimally/maximally
strong and should therefore have their weakest/strongest impact on the attitude for-
mation process. However, as discussed below, although initial uncertainty is neither
5The model was implemented in Delphi 5. The program code can be obtained upon request from the
authors.
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Fig. 3 Exemplary attitude formation processes for two attitudes in teams of 20 agents (D = 3, K = 4),
weak faultlines, and varying initial uncertainty among team members. The shading of circles/diamonds
represents the value of the first demographic attribute of the respective agent; the shaded areas and the
error bars show the range of uncertainty for the selected agent (marked as diamond) on both issues
minimal nor maximal, it nevertheless has strong effects on the attitude formation pro-
cess. In both figures each agent is represented by a circle. Each circle’s location along
the axes represents the values on the first and second of the four attitudes of the re-
spective agent. Note that the initial distribution of attitudes is exactly the same in each
of the four examples. We have selected one agent per realization (represented by a
diamond) to show her level of uncertainty on both attitudes. This is indicated by gray
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Fig. 4 Exemplary attitude formation processes for two attitudes in teams of 20 agents (D = 3, K = 4),
a strong faultline, and varying initial uncertainty among team members. The shading of circles/diamonds
represents the value of the first demographic attribute of the respective agent; the shaded areas and the
error bars show the range of uncertainty for the selected agent (marked as diamond) on both issues
boxes around the position of the selected agent.6 The colors of the circles/diamonds
indicate the value on the first of the three demographic characteristics of the respec-
tive agent (compare Table 1). Note that the coloring of the symbols does not neces-
6For instance, in part (a) of Fig. 3, the horizontal gray box indicates that the focal agent perceives values
between −1 and approximately −0.3 as correct for attitude 1. For attitude 2, the focal agent perceives
values between −1 and approximately −0.5 as correct.
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sarily reflect similarity relations among agents because dyadic similarity is measured
across all demographic characteristics and attitude.
Part (a) of Fig. 3 illustrates the condition in which faultlines are weak and initial
uncertainty is low. The figure shows that in this condition the team ends up frag-
mented into many smaller subgroups whose members hold similar values on one or
both of the two attitudes after 5,000 iterations. At the same time, uncertainty does
not reach its minimum. Especially for the second of the two attitudes, a considerable
level of uncertainty remains as indicated by the gray area around the selected agent.
Part (b) of Fig. 3 shows very different dynamics for initially high uncertainty. After
5,000 iterations, the team arrives at perfect consensus on the two issues. At the same
time, uncertainty decreases to its minimum for all agents, indicated by the disappear-
ance of the gray boxes in the right subfigure.
The underlying dynamics are in both cases driven by the scarcity of initially ‘nega-
tive’ relations among agents that is due to the low faultline strength. There are poten-
tially many pairs of agents who perceive each other as similar. As a consequence, if
initial uncertainty is high (Fig. 3b), positive influence arises in most dyads such that
the selected agent is influenced to move toward the other’s attitude (positive influ-
ence). While in some dyads agents also tend to increase attitude distance, these neg-
ative influences are overall outnumbered by positive influences. As a consequence,
even dissimilar agents are ‘pulled’ toward each other because they are positively in-
fluenced by the same, or at least similar, sets of peers. In this way, the team quickly
arrives at perfect consensus. Once consensus is reached, team members’ attitude sim-
ilarity decreases uncertainty on all attitudes.
If initial uncertainty is low (Fig. 3a), there are only few agents who can actually
influence each other in the initial condition. In many dyads agents hold attitudes out-
side of each others’ uncertainty interval in the random initial condition. Yet, some
pairs of agents are initially sufficiently close to each other in their attitudes. These
agents increase the extent of their agreement with similar others early on in the at-
titude formation process which, in turn, reduces their uncertainty. The decline of
uncertainty countervails further influence from more distant agents and also prevents
that disagreement with those agents increases uncertainty.
Next, we explored the effect of initial uncertainty under the assumption of strong
faultlines. Part (a) of Fig. 4 shows what happens if faultlines are strong and initial
uncertainty is low. After 5,000 iterations, attitudes end up similarly scattered as in the
case of weak faultlines and low initial uncertainty. Again, part (b) of Fig. 4 illustrates
that the outcome is different if initial uncertainty is high. In this case, the team splits
into two opposing (i.e. polarized) subgroups which are internally demographically
homogeneous. In this configuration, uncertainty among team members is very low.
Because faultlines are strong in both conditions, there tend to be about as many
‘positive’ as ‘negative’ relations among agents at the outset. If initial uncertainty is
high (Fig. 4b), this results in either positive or negative influence in most dyads.
Demographically similar agents tend to influence each other positively, while de-
mographically dissimilar agents tend to become more dissimilar in their attitudes.
Attitude differences then align with the strong demographic faultline that separates
the two demographically highly dissimilar subgroups. At the same time, agents’ atti-
tudes do not entirely move toward the extreme end of the attitude continuum toward
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which their subgroup leans. Furthermore, there is also no ‘perfect’ agreement within
each subgroup. The reason is that disagreement among similar agents is low com-
pared to disagreement among dissimilar agents. This reduces agents’ uncertainty and
decreases at the same time their strive for further agreement with similar others.
By contrast, if initial uncertainty is low (Fig. 4a), there are at the outset only few
agents whose attitudes are sufficiently similar to allow influence. Moreover, in those
cases where influence does occur, the outcome of the influence process further re-
duces agents’ uncertainty, countervailing further influence.
The examples presented in Figs. 3 and 4 suggest that the level of initial uncer-
tainty moderates the effect of strong demographic faultlines on attitude dynamics. If
initial uncertainty is high, strong faultlines give rise to polarization of demographic
subgroups. If uncertainty is low, polarization does not occur. The examples also show
that initial uncertainty affects attitude formation if faultlines are weak. If initial un-
certainty is high, teams quickly arrive at perfect consensus but consensus does not
occur if initial uncertainty is low.
The moderation effect suggested by the exemplary realization is confirmed by
the experiments in which we varied both faultline strength and initial uncertainty in-
dependently across the full range of conditions shown in Tables 1 and 2. For each
experimental condition we computed outcome measures after 50,000 iterations, aver-
aged across 50 independent realizations. Figure 5 reports results for the polarization
of demographic subgroups. Part (a) charts the measure of polarization, part (b) dis-
plays the alignment of demographic characteristics and attitudes. The figures indicate
that both polarization and the alignment measure reach a maximum of pol = 0.43 and
cov(fix;flex) = 0.40, respectively, when both faultline strength and initial uncertainty
are maximal (r = 1/μin = 1). Relative to this level, both measures decrease consider-
ably when the initial uncertainty decreases toward its lowest level (μin = 0), holding
faultline strength maximal (r = 1). Polarization drops to 0.20 in this slice of the pa-
rameter space and the alignment measure declines to about 0.13. This suggests that
in groups with strong demographic faultlines, higher initial uncertainty fosters both
subgroup polarization and the alignment of attitude differences with the demographic
faultlines.
A different pattern of effects arises when faultlines are weaker. As Fig. 5 illus-
trates, if faultlines are weakest, both the polarization and the alignment measure vary
much less across different levels of initial uncertainty than they do for strong fault-
lines. For the weakest faultlines, r = 0, we found that polarization is consistently at
a low level and decreases from 0.16 to 0.03 when μin is increased from 0 to 1. The
alignment measure cov(fix;flex) decreases from 0.03 to 0.01 in the same slice of the
parameter space.
The interplay of faultline strength and initial uncertainty also affects the variation
of attitudes in teams (measure var). As part (a) of Fig. 6 indicates, for weak faultlines
(r = 0) var decreases from about 0.29 to about 0.03 with increasing initial uncertainty
(i.e. from μin = 0.0 to μin = 1). Figure 6 shows further that the result is different if
faultlines are strong (r = 1). Here, initial uncertainty hardly affects attitude variance.
For example, var only decreases from 0.51 to 0.45 between μin = 0 and μin = 1. This
is because both positive and negative influence are suppressed if initial uncertainty is
low. Despite strong faultlines, the resulting attitude distribution is fragmented. But if
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Fig. 5 Polarization (pol) and
co-variation of fixed and flexible
attributes (cov(fix;flex)) at
varying levels of faultline
strength and initial uncertainty;
outcome measures are averaged
over 50 independent realizations
of each of the 36 combinations
of faultline strength and initial
uncertainty; each realization
with 50,000 iterations
uncertainty is high, agents are open to influence and the team polarizes into opposing
subgroups, due to the strong faultline. In both cases there is a comparatively high
variation in attitudes in the team. Finally, part (b) of Fig. 6 shows that the mean
level of average uncertainty (μ) after 50,000 iterations is quite low in all teams. The
reason is that the dynamics of the system stabilize when a configuration of attitudes
and individual uncertainty levels is reached that brings the further influence process
to a hold.
The results show that the averaged outcome measures fall between 0.00 and about
0.50, a range that is relatively small compared to the theoretical boundaries. This
reflects that due to the effects of uncertainty our model seldomly generates overall
‘perfect consensus’ or ‘perfect polarization’ in the sense that all agents hold exactly
the same or maximally opposing attitudes. Nevertheless, our results show a clear
qualitative pattern: the level of initial uncertainty moderates the effect that faultlines
have on the cohesion of teams in terms of subgroup polarization and consensus.
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Fig. 6 Attitude variance (var)
and average uncertainty (μ) at
varying levels of faultline
strength and initial uncertainty;
outcome measures are averaged
over 50 independent realizations
of each of the 36 combinations
of faultline strength and initial
uncertainty; each realization
with 50,000 iterations
5 Summary and conclusion
Lau and Murnighan’s (1998) faultline theory suggests that the stronger demographic
faultlines in work teams are, the more likely it is that social identification and influ-
ence processes induce polarization of demographic subgroups, alongside with lower
cohesion and higher conflict potential in the overall team. Conversely, the weaker
faultlines are, the more likely it is that influence processes generate consensus. In this
contribution we integrated into faultline theory the insight from social psychology
that influence processes depend on the certainty with which individuals hold their at-
titudes. We argued that this may generate new insights for faultline theory. The level
of initial uncertainty among team members may moderate the effect that demographic
faultlines have on team cohesion. At the same time, we argued that it is hard to gain
solid intuitions about this by informal means, because uncertainty is also endogenous
to the attitude formation process.
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To test our reasoning, we extended an earlier formalization of faultline theory pro-
posed by Flache and Mäs (2008a, 2008b) toward a formal model of how demographic
faultlines affect the interplay of attitude dynamics and the dynamics of uncertainty in
a team. Computational experiments with this model generated the expected moderat-
ing effect of uncertainty.
This finding also sheds new light on earlier research that assumed effects of un-
certainty on the performance of diverse teams (as in Cannella et al. 2008; Carpenter
2002; Carpenter and Fredrickson 2001; Keck 1997). These studies reported mixed
effects, with diverse teams sometimes performing better, worse, or not different if
uncertainty is high. We found that if diversity in a team is held constant, variations
in uncertainty interact with faultline strength in affecting the level of consensus or
subgroup polarization. Although consensus and polarization do not directly trans-
late into performance, Lau and Murnighan (1998) suggested that polarization can
increase conflict and thereby reduce performance. One might therefore expect that
the performance of diverse teams under uncertainty partly depends on the strength of
demographic faultlines.
Our research also points to new future directions for theoretical faultline research.
We have shown that uncertainty matters, but we have not explored effects of hetero-
geneity in this agent characteristic. However, research on the effects of extremists on
attitude formation processes in groups (e.g. Deffuant et al. 2002; Flache and Toren-
vlied 2004) suggests that the existence of extremists might importantly affect out-
comes of the attitude formation process, if such individuals are less uncertain about
their views than moderates. Extremist agents can then lead to polarization in groups
by ‘pulling’ other less extreme and more uncertain agents toward them. This raises
the question whether including a connection between extremism and uncertainty in
our model would change results. A related intriguing possibility is that the effect of
extremists on polarization may be countervailed, if also moderates are sufficiently
certain about their attitudes. As Gross et al. (1995) have stressed, the concepts of
extremity and uncertainty are analytically distinct. That is, even agents who hold
moderate positions might be highly convinced of the correctness of their attitudes.
Our model may help to shed light on the conditions under which moderates become
less uncertain than extremists and vice versa. For instance, if a moderate position
finds much support by other individuals, whereas extreme positions receive less sup-
port, moderates might be less uncertain about their evaluation than extremists and
therefore might be able to ‘pull’ extremist toward moderate positions.
Another complication that we have neglected is that the effects of (dis)agreement
and (dis)similarity on uncertainty may vary with the salience that a particular issue
has for an individual (Holtz and Miller 1985, 2001). The more important an issue is
for the identity and self-value of an individual, the more (dis)agreement with relevant
others on this issue will affect uncertainty. Hence, teams in which there is low un-
certainty about few central issues but high uncertainty about a number of less central
issues might experience less polarization than teams in which there is low uncer-
tainty about a large number of less important issues but very high uncertainty about
few central issues.
Finally, demographic characteristics and attitudes weigh in our formal model
equally in determining agents’ similarity, and their relative weight does not change
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throughout the entire ‘life cycle’ of a team. However, Lau and Murnighan (1998)
suggested that the relative weights of demographic characteristics and attitudes might
change over time; team members may initially base their assessment of others’ sim-
ilarity more on demographic characteristics, while similarity in attitudes becomes
more important later on.7 The reason is that surface demographic characteristics are
very accessible whereas individuals need to learn about each others’ attitudes during
interaction. Flache and Mäs (2008a) already showed that the timing of social inter-
action can have effects on faultline dynamics. Our findings suggest that timing of
who learns when about whose attitude might also be an important issue in relation to
uncertainty. For instance, the negative effects of strong faultlines in the case of high
uncertainty might be avoided by giving team members only the possibility to learn
about the attitudes of those who are similar to them in terms of both demographic
characteristics and attitudes. This could decrease their uncertainty and thereby safe-
guard them from becoming more extreme when they succinctly learn about the atti-
tudes of dissimilar others.
Despite the need for further research, we believe that our theoretical study points to
important implications for managerial practice. Our findings suggest that uncertainty
in team members’ attitudes might be an important determinant for attitude formation
processes. Moreover, this determinant interacts with the team’s demographic compo-
sition. According to our theoretical experiments, managers might benefit from avoid-
ing situations that create high levels of uncertainty among team members if there is a
strong demographic faultline within a team. Our integration of faultline theory with
theories of social influence suggests that if managers fail to provide objective means
for decreasing uncertainty, members of a team with strong demographic faultlines
might overly rely on socially provided definitions of the situation, potentially leading
to polarization along the faultline between demographic subgroups. If, on the other
hand, demographic faultlines are weak, then consensus finding processes might be
enhanced if team members ‘stick less’ to their own attitudes. It appears that in this
case actions that make team members somewhat more uncertain in their attitudes
(e.g. by providing information that challenges current views within the team) could
be beneficial by instigating a reconsideration of the situation by team members.
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